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Abstract
We provide a model in which upstream producers, whose production cost is quadratic
in quantity, sell their products through two distribution channels, a traditional channel and
an external retailer. Some producers (called \large" producers) supply to both channels,
whereas other producers (called \small" producers) are only able to supply to the tradi-
tional channel. All producers compete in quantity in the traditional channel. The external
retailer oers a nondiscriminatory per unit payment to upstream producers. We show that
distribution channel expansion executed by a small producer can decrease the producer's
prot and the sum of the upstream producers' prots.
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1 Introduction
Distribution channel expansion is important for producers, such as manufacturers and agri-
cultural farmers, because such an expansion seems to bring greater prots.1 For instance,
agricultural farmers have recently appeared eager to nd additional distribution channels to
expand their earning opportunities, although agricultural cooperatives have typically repre-
sented the distributors of agricultural goods produced by farmers.2 Some individual farmers
seek out retailers and, then, directly negotiate and sell their agricultural products to those
retailers.3 Additionally, some regional agricultural cooperatives in Japan support their mem-
ber farmers by distributing products through nationwide retailers and signing agreements for
cooperative distribution of those farmers' agricultural products.4 Although similar eorts to
expand distribution channels seem to benet the farmers, is this always the case? We con-
sider the inuence of distribution channel expansion on the protability of producers such as
manufacturers and agricultural farmers.
We construct a model in which producers sell their products through two distribution
channels, a traditional channel and external retailers. Each producer has common increasing
marginal cost technology, which follows the assumptions in related papers that discuss agricul-
tural product distributions (e.g., Albk and Schultz, 1998; Karantininis and Zago, 2001; Agbo
et al., 2015). We believe that this assumption is also applicable to manufacturing sectors with
production capacity constraints that limit their productivity and increase their marginal costs.5
We assume that some producers can distribute their products through both channels, although
the other producers can distribute their products only through the traditional channel. We
1 Direct marketing by manufacturers is a typical example of distribution channel expansion, which has been
intensively discussed in the context of management (e.g., Chiang et al., 2003).
2 In the context of agricultural products, Fulton and Giannakas (2013) provide an excellent survey on agri-
cultural cooperatives. Agbo et al. (2015) summarize the recent trends in the role of agricultural cooperatives
worldwide.
3 In such cases, some agricultural products are sold bearing the name of the agricultural producer (for
instance, Mr. X's tomatoes, where X is the family name of the farmer).
4 Kawamura et al. (2011) explain the case of JA (Japan Agricultural Cooperatives) Tomisato-City.
5 The plausibility of assuming increasing marginal cost is briey mentioned in Matsushima and Zhao (2015),
who discuss a multi-market model with a monopoly manufacturer and two local monopoly retailers. Detailed
discussions on increasing marginal costs are available, for instance, in Soderbery (2014) and Ahn and McQuoid
(2015).
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call the former type of producer a \large producer" and the latter a \small producer." The
assumption reects the asymmetry in producers' abilities to nd new distribution channels.
Given the market environment, we consider the following scenario concerning external retail-
ers: a for-prot retailer is the external retailer and unilaterally oers a (nondiscriminatory)
per unit purchasing price for large producers.6 This implies that the retailer has substantial
bargaining power.
Given a xed number of producers, we investigate the eect of distribution channel expan-
sion executed by a small producer on market performance. First, expanding a small producer's
distribution channel (in other words, a small producer becomes a large producer) does not
always increase the sum of the producers' prots. Second, the prot of each large producer can
be smaller than that of each small producer if the number of large producers is large. Third, for
each small producer, expanding distribution channels actually decreases its prot if the number
of pre-existing large producers is large. The results imply that expanding distribution channels
is not always achievable in industries with increasing marginal cost technology. Finally, given
a xed number of producers, an increase in the number of large producers always benets each
producer who remains small and does not supply its product to the external retailer. That is,
there is a free-rider eect of channel expansion executed by rival small producers on remaining
small producers.
The mechanism behind the results is as follows. From the perspective of the (monopson-
istic) external retailer, expanding a small producer's distribution channel generates a supply
expansion for the retailer. This supply expansion allows the external retailer to set a lower
purchasing price, which decreases the prots of all large producers. Given a xed number of
producers, the negative eect of a lower purchasing price intensies as the number of large pro-
ducers increases. From the perspective of small producers, by denition, each small producer
cannot supply goods to the external retailer. The inability of each small producer to supply
goods functions as a commitment to greater supply through the traditional channel, which
6 We briey discuss another scenario: each large producer has an opportunity to sell its goods at a common
exogenous price. The scenario might capture a case in which large producers have sucient opportunity to
supply their products to mutually independent external retailers.
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induces large producers to produce less through the traditional channel because of strategic
substitutability and the convexity of production costs. When the number of large producers is
larger, the commitment works well, and the protability in the external channel decreases be-
cause the purchasing price is lower. Therefore, when the number of pre-existing large producers
is large, each remaining small producer earns a higher prot and does not have an incentive to
become a large producer.
We believe that our model is applicable to the agricultural industry and the manufacturing
industry in which manufacturers, whose production technology has an increasing marginal cost,
export their products through merchandisers and export agents, although our model is based
on the agricultural industry. In the context of international trade, the traditional and external
channels in our model are related to domestic and foreign markets, respectively. Intermediaries
(e.g., world-wide retailers and general traders) have an important role in the export of manu-
facturers' products (Coe and Hess, 2005). Intermediaries would have stronger bargaining power
over domestic manufacturers as the market environments in importing countries (e.g., business
customs and regulations) become unclear because the advantages of those intermediaries (e.g.,
informational advantage in countries and the personal connections to local business networks)
strengthen. These advantages are signicant, particularly in developing and transitional coun-
tries. Our results imply that expanding distribution channels to those countries might not
be advantageous for manufacturers if intermediaries' bargaining power is strong, even if the
markets in those countries seem to have sucient protability.
Our model is a modication of that of Karantininis and Zago (2001) and Agbo et al. (2015),
who discuss vertical relations between farmers and agricultural cooperatives. Karantininis and
Zago (2001) consider an oligopolistic farmer market in which each farmer distributes goods to
only one of two channels, an agricultural cooperative and an investor-owned rm (a for-prot
retailer).7 Karantininis and Zago (2001) and Agbo et al. (2015) are, respectively, related to
the traditional channel and the external retailer in our paper. The authors discuss the re-
7 Albk and Schultz (1998) also discuss a situation in which each farmer distributes its product to only one
of two channels, an agricultural cooperative and a prot maximizing rm. The authors show that cooperative
membership is more protable for farmers.
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lation between the protability of the farmers and the number of farmers that distribute to
the agricultural cooperative. The authors do not consider a situation in which some manu-
facturers/farmers are able to use both distribution channels. Agbo et al. (2015) consider an
oligopolistic farmers market in which each farmer is able to distribute its goods through two
channels, an agricultural cooperative and the producer's own direct selling. The retail price of
the agricultural cooperative is exogenous and oers a purchasing price for the farmers. The
farmers compete in quantity in the direct selling channel. The roles of the two channels in
Agbo et al. (2015) are dierent from those of the channels in our paper. We assume that
some of the manufacturers/farmers (not all manufacturers/farmers) can distribute their goods
through both retail channels, which also diers from Agbo et al. (2015).8 As noted by Agbo
et al. (2015), our model follows the literature of multi-market oligopoly models (e.g., Bulow
et al., 1985; Kawasaki et al., 2014) although most of those models do not deal with strategic
interactions between manufacturers and retailers. In a dierent context, Matsushima and Shi-
nohara (2014) discuss an upstream monopolist's decision to increase its downstream trading
partners as in our model, although the authors' model cannot discuss upstream competition
to the extent of our model. Our paper contributes to the agricultural goods distribution and
multi-market oligopoly contexts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the basic model. Section 3 solves the
model. Sections 4 and 5 provide comparative statics of our result. Section 6 concludes the
paper. Section 7 is the Appendix.
2 Basic model
There are N( 3) producers producing a good that is potentially distributed through two
distribution channels, a traditional distribution channel and external retailers. Hereafter, we
call the external retailer \the retailer." M( N) producers can distribute their goods to
both channels although the remainder, N  M producers, distribute their goods only to the
traditional channel due to the lack of marketing ability. We call the former type of producers
8 Moreover, in the two previous papers, the authors assume that each farmer gains the cooperative's prot
divided by the number of farmers.
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\large producers" and the latter type \small producers." The production cost of the producer
i is cq2i =2, where c is a positive constant and qi is the total production of producer i (i =
1; 2; : : : ; N). A large producer i supplies qit units to the traditional channel and qir units to
the retailer, where qit + qir = qi (i = 1; : : : ;M). The small producer i supplies qit units to the
traditional channel only (i =M + 1; : : : ; N).
In the traditional channel, the N producers compete in quantity. The inverse demand in
the traditional channel is given by pt =  Qt; where  and  are positive constants, and Qt is
the total quantity supplied by the producers (Qt =
PN
i=1 qit). Thus, the revenue of producer i
from the traditional channel is given as ptqit. The consumer surplus in the distribution channel
is given as CSt = Q
2
t =2. For analytical simplicity, we assume that the per unit revenue from
the traditional channel is independent of the quantity distributed in the other distribution
channel.
The for-prot retailer unilaterally sets a nondiscriminatory per unit payment wr to each
producer. We assume that the retailer cannot refuse any selling order by producers. That is,
given wr, if producer i sells qir units to the retailer, then wrqir becomes producer i's revenue
from the distribution through the retailer (i = 1; : : : ;M). Per unit revenue of the retailer from
the distribution is given by pr =   Qr; where  and  are positive constants, and Qr is the
total quantity supplied by the producers (Qr =
PM
i=1 qir). For simplicity, we assume that the
operating cost of the retailer is zero. The prot of the retailer is given as
r = (  Qr)Qr   wrQr:
The consumer surplus in the distribution channel is given as CSr = Q
2
r=2.
The assumption on the inverse demand functions in the two distribution channels implies
that the downstream markets are independent and do not have any interaction. We impose
this assumption for the following reasons: to simplify the analysis and to render the model ap-
plicable to the context of international trade. We believe that the simplication is applicable
to the context of agricultural goods distribution if we consider a situation in which the tradi-
tional channel is related to distribution through regional cooperatives in rural regions, and the
external channel is related to distribution through large retailers in urban regions, which are
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independent. In Section 5, we briey discuss how the assumption inuences the main results.
The prot of large producer i is summarized as follows (the superscript \l" represents
\large" producer)
li = (  Qt)qit + wrqir   c(qit + qir)2=2:
The prot of small producer i is summarized as follows (the superscript \s" represents \small"
producer)
si = (  Qt)qit   cq2it=2:
The total surplus is given as
W 
MX
i=1
li +
NX
i=M+1
si + r + CSt + CSr:
We solve the following two-stage game. In the rst stage, the retailer unilaterally sets wr. In
the second stage, observing the rst stage outcome, each producer simultaneously determines
its quantities, qit and qir, if possible.
3 Equilibrium quantities and purchase price
We solve the game using backward induction.
3.1 The second stage
Given the per-unit payment level for each producer wr, the maximization problems of large
and small producers are given as
max
qit;qir
(  Qt)qit + wrqir   c(qit + qir)2=2; s:t: qit  0; qir  0 (i = 1; : : : ;M);
max
qit
(  Qt)qit   cq2it=2; s:t: qit  0 (i =M + 1; : : : ; N):
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The maximization problems lead to the following equilibrium quantities in the subgame:
qlir(wr) =
8>><>>:
(c+ )((c+ (N + 1))wr   c)
c((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))
if wr < w(N;M);
wr
c
if wr  w(N;M);
(1)
qlit(wr) =
8><>:
(c+ )  (c+ (N  M + 1))wr
((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))
if wr < w(N;M);
0 if wr  w(N;M);
(2)
qsit(wr) =
8>><>>:
+Mwr
(M + 1)c+ (N + 1)
if wr < w(N;M);

c+ (N  M + 1) if wr  w(N;M);
(3)
pt(wr) =
8>><>>:
(c+ )(+Mwr)
(M + 1)c+ (N + 1)
if wr < w(N;M);
(c+ )
c+ (N  M + 1) if wr  w(N;M);
(4)
where w(N;M)  (c+ )
c+ (N  M + 1) : (5)
Note that qsit(wr) does not depend on wr when wr  w(N;M) because strategic interaction
through the convex production costs of the large producers disappears when wr is large.
The prots are given as
li(wr) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
wr(c+ )((c+ (N + 1))wr   c)
c((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))
+
(+Mwr)(c+ )((c+ )  (c+ (N  M + 1))wr)
((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))2
  w
2
r
2c
if wr < w(N;M);
w2r
2c
if wr  w(N;M);
(6)
si (wr) =
8>>><>>>:
(c+ 2)(+Mwr)
2
2((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))2
if wr < w(N;M);
(c+ 2)2
2(c+ (N  M + 1))2 if wr  w(N;M):
(7)
3.2 The rst stage
Anticipating the second-stage outcome, the retailer unilaterally sets wr in the rst stage. The
objective of the retailer is given as
r(wr) =
 
  
MX
i=1
qlir(wr)
!
MX
i=1
qlir(wr)  wr
MX
i=1
qlir(wr):
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Solving the maximization problem of the retailer, we have the equilibrium per unit payment,
wr :
wr =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
c((N + 1)(1 +N + 2M)2 + (3(N + 1) + (5 + 3N)M)c+ 2(1 + 2M)c2)
D
if ~Ma < M;
w(N;M) if ~Mb M  ~Ma;
c
2(c+M)
if M < ~Mb;
(8)
where D  2(c+ (N + 1))((N + 1)M2 + ((N + 1) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2);
~Ma  c(N   1)((N + 1) + c)
(2(N + 1)2 + (5 + 3N)c + 4c2)
; ~Mb  c( c+ (N   1))
(3c+ 2)
:
Note that for ~Mb  M  ~Ma, the optimal wr is at w(N;M), which induces the constraint
of each large producer to be just binding. Note also that no large producer supplies to the
traditional channel if and only if M  ~Ma: We now mention a remark on the range of M in
which wr = w(N;M). The dierence between ~Ma and ~Mb is less than one for large parameter
ranges. Specically, we can show the following remark:
Remark 1 If 44 + 16c3 + 21c22 + 6c3   4c4 > 0, 0 < ~Ma   ~Mb < 1:
This remark implies that the range [ ~Mb; ~Ma] is narrow unless the production technology is not
too convex in quantity. Therefore, in Section 5, we mainly consider the case in which M is
within the range [0; ~Mb] or [ ~Ma; N ].
Substituting wr into the second-stage outcome, we have the equilibrium prots of the full
game.
r =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(N + 1)2M2(c+ )
4(c+ (1 +N))((1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2)
if ~Ma < M;
M2(c+ )(cN   ( + 2c)M)
c2(c+  + (N  M))2 if
~Mb M  ~Ma;
M2
4(c+M)
if M < ~Mb:
(9)
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li(w

r) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
c(N + 1)2(c+ )(c+ (1 +N))
D2
((1 +N)(1 +N + 2M)2 + (3 + 3N + (5 + 3N)M)c + 2(1 + 2M)c2)
+
2(c+ )
D2
(2(1 +N)M2 + (2 + 2N + (5 + 3N)M)c + 2(1 + 2M)c2)
(2(1 +N)M2 + (1 N2 + (5 + 3N)M)c + (1 N + 4M)c2)
 c
2((1 +N)(1 +N + 2M)2 + (3(1 +N) + (5 + 3N)M)c+ 2(1 + 2M)c2)2
2D2
if ~Ma < M;
2(c+ )2
2c(c+  + (N  M))2 if
~Mb M  ~Ma;
c2
8(c+M)2
if M < ~Mb:
(10)
si (w

r) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
2(c+ 2)(2(1 +N)M2 + (2 + 2N + 5M + 3MN)c+ 2(1 + 2M)c2)
8(c+ (1 +N))2((1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2)2
if ~Ma < M;
2(c+ 2)
2(c+  + (N  M))2 if
~Mb M  ~Ma;
2(c+ 2)
2(c+  + (N  M))2 if M <
~Mb:
(11)
We also have the equilibrium quantities and price.
qlir(w

r) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
(N + 1)(c+ )
2((1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2)
if ~Ma < M;
(c+ )
c(c+  + (N  M)) if
~Mb M  ~Ma;

2(c+M)
if M < ~Mb:
(12)
qlit(w

r) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(2(1 +N)M2   (N2   3MN   5M   1)c   (N   4M   1)c2)
2(c+ (1 +N))((1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2)
if ~Ma < M;
0 if ~Mb M  ~Ma;
0 if M < ~Mb:
(13)
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qsit(w

r) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
(2(1 +N)M2 + (2N + 3MN + 5M + 2)c + 2(1 + 2M)c2)
2(c+ (1 +N))((1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2)
if ~Ma < M;

c+  + (N  M) if
~Mb M  ~Ma;

c+  + (N  M) if M <
~Mb:
(14)
pt =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
(c+ )(2(1 +N)M2 + (2N + 3MN + 5M + 2)c + 2(1 + 2M)c2)
2(c+ (1 +N))((1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2)
if ~Ma < M;
(c+ )
c+  + (N  M) if
~Mb M  ~Ma;
(c+ )
c+  + (N  M) if M <
~Mb:
(15)
4 Benchmark case (wr is exogenous)
To clarify the mechanism in the main model, as a benchmark, we rst consider the case in
which wr is exogenously given. That is, we check the equilibrium property in the second
stage. Concretely, we show how an increase in M inuences the quantities (qlir(wr), q
l
it(wr),
and qsit(wr)), the prots of large and small producers (
l
i(wr) and 
s
i (wr)), and the sum of
producers' prots (Mli(wr) + (N  M)si (wr)).
We think that the exogenous per unit payment case might capture a situation in which large
producers have sucient opportunities to nd their mutually independent external distribution
channels and, as a result, the per unit payment for the large producers does not change with
the sum of the quantities supplied by them to the external distribution channels. Although
in the main model we explicitly consider the traditional and the external channels and the
optimization problem of the retailer in the external channel, the case in this section assumes
that the per unit payment for large producers represents exogenous protable opportunities
for the large producers only.
To secure that both cases in the second stage (each large producer supplies (i) to both
channels, and (ii) only to external distribution channels) appear within the range ofM ([0; N ]),
we impose the following assumption on wr:
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Assumption 1 wr is not small or large. Specically,
min

(c+ )
c+ (N + 1)
;
(2(2N + 1)c+ (N + 1)(3N + 1))c
2(c+ (N + 1))((2N + 1)c+N(N + 1))

 wr < :
The upper bound implies that the external purchase price is not larger than the intercept of
the inverse demand function (), which is reasonable. The upper bound also secures that each
large producer supplies to both channels when M is suciently large. The lower bound of wr
is w(N; 0) or wr jM=N (see (5) and (8), respectively). w(N; 0) is the threshold value of wr in
which each large producer supplies only to the external retailer. If wr is smaller than w(N; 0),
large producers always supply to both channels for any M . wr jM=N is the lowest level of wr
in the main model (note that wr in (8) is minimized at M = N within the range M , [0; N ]).
It is reasonable to set the two values of wr as the possible lowest exogenous value of wr. Note
that Assumption 1 ensures that qlir(wr) in (1) is positive when wr < w(N;M).
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The quantities We mention how an increase in M inuences the quantities supplied by the
producers. First, when wr  w(N;M) (when M is small), most of the producers (specically,
N  M producers) supply their products only to the traditional channel, and the protability
of the traditional channel is low. Given this low protability in the traditional channel and the
increasing marginal cost production technology, M large producers concentrate on their supply
to external distribution channels, which induces that no large producer supplies through the
traditional channel (see qlit(wr) in (2)). As a result, there is no strategic interaction between
external distribution channels and the traditional channel through those large producers with
increasing marginal cost technology, and a marginal increase in M purely works as an exit
by a small producer from the traditional channel. This exit allows small producers to expand
the quantities distributed through the traditional channel (see qsit(wr) in (3)). Second, when
wr < w(N;M) (when M is large), traditional channel protability is higher than when wr 
w(N;M). Given this higher protability from the traditional channel, M large producers
supply their products through the traditional channel, which increases their marginal costs
to supply through external distribution channels because of the increasing marginal cost for
9 If wr is suciently small, we must consider another corner solution in which all producers supply through
the traditional channel only, but obviously this case is not important in our paper.
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production technology. As a result, an increase in M decreases qlir(wr) in (1) but increases
qlit(wr) in (2). For producers who remain small, a marginal increase in M works as a \partial"
exit by a small producer from the traditional channel. Concretely, the small producer who
becomes a large producer decreases its quantity distributed through the traditional channel,
which allows producers who remain small to expand their quantities distributed through the
traditional channel; that is, qsit(wr) in (3) increases in M . Figure 1 shows a graphical example
of how the quantities change with an increase in M .
[Figure 1 about here]
Proposition 1 When M is small such that wr  w(N;M), qlir(wr) in (1) and qlit(wr) in
(2) are independent of M . When M is large such that wr < w(N;M), q
l
ir(wr) in (1) always
decreases with an increase in M , although qlit(wr) in (2) always increases with an increase in
M . qsit(wr) in (3) always increases with an increase in M .
The prots First, when wr  w(N;M), the prot of each large producer, li(wr) in (6), is
constant because the producer does not supply through the traditional channel but supplies
its product through external distribution channels as if it is a price taker whose selling price
is wr. In contrast, the prot of each small producer, 
s
i (wr) in (7), monotonically increases
with an increase in M because the exits by past small producers from the traditional channel
increase the retail price of the traditional channel. From the upstream industry's perspective, an
increase in M monotonically increases the sum of the producers' prots because an expansion
of a small producer's distribution channel simply works as a prot opportunity expansion
within the industry. Second, when wr < w(N;M), the prot of each large producer, 
l
i(wr)
in (6), monotonically increases in M . This prot increase stems from an increase in the prot
from the supply through the traditional channels from the mitigation of competition, which is
related to the previous discussion on quantities. The prot of each small producer, si (wr) in
(7), monotonically increases with an increase in M , which also comes from the mitigation of
competition in the traditional channel. As in the case in which wr  w(N;M), an increase
in M monotonically increases the sum of the producers' prots. Note that the prot of each
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small producer is higher than that of each large producer when the number of large producers is
greater than a threshold value. This is because the inability of each small producer to supply its
goods to external distribution channels functions as a commitment to a larger supply through
the traditional channel, which induces large producers to produce less because of strategic
substitutability and the convexity of production costs. Figures 2 and 3 summarize the change
in prots.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
Proposition 2 When M is small such that wr  w(N;M), li(wr) in (6) is independent of
M . When M is large such that wr < w(N;M), 
l
i(wr) in (6) always increases with an increase
in M . si (wr) in (7) always increases with an increase in M . The sum of the producers' prots
monotonically increases with an increase in M .
5 The main case (wr is endogenous)
Our main focus is to investigate how the number of large producers inuences the equilibrium
outcome through a change in wr. To do so, we investigate how an increase in M inuences
the endogenous values step by step: quantities, retail price, purchase price, prots, and total
surplus.
The quantities Except for a change in the purchase price, the basic properties of the main
case are shared with the benchmark case. As in the previous section, an increase in the number
of large producers lowers the quantity supplied by each supplier to the retailer, qlir(w

r), except
for the case in which ~Mb  M  ~Ma. We, therefore, explain retailer pricing. An increase
in M is a supply expansion of goods that allows the retailer to set a lower wr inducing each
of the producers to produce less for the retailer. When M becomes larger than the threshold
value ~Ma, as in the previous section, each large producer supplies through both channels (see
qlit(w

r) in (13)). The quantity supplied by each small producer monotonically increases with
an increase in M . Figure 4 shows a graphical example of how an increase in M inuences the
quantities.
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[Figure 4 about here]
Proposition 3 qlit(w

r) in (13) increases with an increase in M if M  ~Ma, otherwise, it is
zero. qlir(w

r) in (12) decreases with an increase in M if M is on the range [0;
~Mb] or [ ~Ma; N),
otherwise, it increases with an increases inM . qsit(w

r) in (14) always increases with an increase
in M .
Purchase price wr and retail price pt The purchase price wr decreases with an increase
in the number of large producers, except for the case in which ~Mb  M  ~Ma. Although the
quantity supplied by each large producer to the retailer decreases with an increase in M , the
total quantity supplied increases, which allows the retailer to set a lower purchase price wr . As
in the previous section, a marginal increase in M functions as an exit (or a partial exit) by a
small producer from the traditional channel, which enhances the protability of the traditional
channel. However, the continuous decrease in wr through an increase in M diminishes the
protability increment from the traditional channel because the quantity reduction by large
producers in the external channel allows the large producers to increase their quantities supplied
through the traditional channel because of the production cost convexity. As a result, the
marginal increment of the retail price in the traditional channel pt substantially decreases
when M  ~Ma. Figure 5 shows a graphical example of how an increase in M inuences wr
and pt .10
[Figure 5 about here]
Proposition 4 wr in (8) decreases with an increase in M if M is within the range [0; ~Mb] or
[ ~Ma; N), otherwise, it increases with an increase in M . p

t in (15) always increases with an
increase in M .
Prots and total surplus When M > ~Ma, the prot of each large producer monotonically
decreases with an increase in M up to a threshold value of M and slightly increases with a
10 In Figure 5, wr and p

t overlap on the range [ ~Mb; ~Ma], that is, those values are the same within the range
[ ~Mb; ~Ma] because each large producer just halts supply through the traditional channel. This implies that the
marginal revenues from the two channels are the same, that is, wr = p

t within the range [ ~Mb; ~Ma].
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further increase in M . The former prot decrease stems from the substantial decrease in the
purchase price wr, and the latter slight prot increase stems from an increase in the prot from
the supply through the traditional channel, as in the previous section.
Contrary to the change in each large producer's prot, the prot of each small producer
monotonically increases with an increase in M . This is correlated with an increase in the
retail price of the traditional channel, as in the previous section. Additionally, the prot of
each small producer is higher than that of each large producer when the number of large
producers is greater than a threshold value. The reason is similar to that in the previous
section. Moreover, the prot of a small producer decreases by expanding its distribution
channel if M is large; that is, a small producer does not have an incentive to expand its
distribution channel if there is a substantial number of existing large producers. When M is
large, the benecial commitment not to supply to the retailer is eective, and the protability
of the external channel is not great because the retailer sets a lower purchase price as M
increases. We can show a sucient condition that expanding a small producer's distribution
channel actually decreases the small producer's prot. Distribution channel expansion by a
small rm is detrimental to it if M  N=3.11 Figure 6 shows a graphical example of how an
increase in M inuences li(w

r) and 
s
i (w

r).
[Figure 6 about here]
Proposition 5 li(w

r) in (10) decreases with an increase in M if M is within the range [0;
~Mb]
or [ ~Ma;Mc), otherwise, it increases with an increases in M , where
Mc  (c+ (1 +N))(2c+ (1 +N))((2N   1)c+ (1 +N))
(3c+ (1 +N))(2(1 +N)2 + (5 + 3N)c + 4c2)
:
si (w

r) in (11) always increases with an increase in M . 
s
i (w

r) in (11) is larger than 
l
i(w

r)
in (10) if M is larger than a threshold value. A small producer does not have an incentive to
become a large producer if M  N=3.
11The prot deterioration occurs for more wide range of M . For instance, when  = 1,  = 1, N = 30, and
c = 2, expanding the distribution channel is detrimental to a small producer if M  9, which is smaller than
30=3 = 10.
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The sum of the producers' prots can nonmonotonically change with an increase in M
because the purchase price wr decreases with an increase in M . For M > ~Ma, the partial
derivative of the sum with respect to M is given as
@(Mli(w

r) + (N  M)si (wr))
@M
=
c(1 +N)2E(c+ (1 +N))2
D3
;
where D is dened in the previous section and E  fc(c + (1 + N))((1 + N)22 + (2N2 +
9N   1)c + 2(3N   1)c2)g   f(1 +N)34 + (1 +N)(9 + 4N + 3N2)c3 + (26 + 21N + 5N2 +
2N3)c22 + 6(5 + N)c3   4(N   3)c4gM . When M = N , the sign of the partial derivative
is equivalent with that of  N(1 +N)33   (1 + N)( 1 + 6N +N2 + 2N3)c2   (1 + 11N +
2N2)c2+2( 1  3N +2N2)c3, which is negative whenever c is not suciently large. That is,
if the production function of each producer is not too convex, an increase in M can decrease
the sum of the producers' prots. Figures 7 and 8 show graphical examples of how an increase
in M inuences Mli(w

r) + (N  M)si (wr). Particularly, from Figure 8, we expect that, on a
large parameter range of c, an increase in M will not enhance the total prot of the producers
when large producers supply through the traditional channel as well as the external channel.
The relation between the sum of the producers' prots andM is quite dierent from that in the
previous section. The relation in this section stems from the monotonic decrease in wr when
M is large. The price decrease is applied to all the quantities supplied in the external channel,
which substantially reduces the prots of large producers when M is large. This eect does
not exist in the exogenous purchase price case (see the previous section). Note that, when M
is small, the prot level in the main case is larger than that in the benchmark case in which wr
is not large (see Figures 3 and 7). When M is positive and small, the total prot in the main
case is larger than that in the benchmark case because the retailer sets a higher price when M
is small.
[Figures 7 and 8 about here]
Proposition 6 The sum of the producers' prots nonmonotonically changes with an increase
in M when c is not suciently large.
We discuss how the independence of the downstream markets inuences the main results.
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We could extend our demand system to the following: pi =    Qi   Qj ; (i; j = t; r,
j 6= i, and  2 [0; 1)). This demand system nests our current demand system a special case
(the case of  = 0), although the analysis becomes substantially complicated. Under the
extended demand system, distribution channel expansion directly reduces the market size in
the traditional channel, which diminishes the quantities supplied by small producers. This
implies that the importance of becoming a large producer intensies as the substitutability of
the two channels increases. We expect that the prot of each small producer is always smaller
than that of each large producer if the substitutability of the two channels () is high, in
contrast with the result in the main model. We also expect that the nonmonotonicity of the
total prots in the upstream would still hold because the purchase power of the retailer remains
even under the extended demand system.
The results in Sections 4 and 5 and the above brief discussion imply that we should seriously
take into account the market structures when we consider distribution channel expansion in
upstream industries.
Finally, we briey mention the total surplus property.
Proposition 7 The total surplus, W , monotonically increases with an increase in M .
Figure 9 shows a graphical example of how an increase in M inuences W .
[Figure 9 about here]
6 Conclusion
We consider a market with a vertical relation in which upstream producers produce their
goods and then sell them through two distribution channels, a traditional channel and external
retailers. We assume that some of the producers (small producers) are able to distribute their
products only through the traditional channel, whereas the other producers (large producers)
can distribute to both channels. We discuss the inuence of the number of large producers on
the equilibrium outcome.
Given a xed number of producers, we show several results: an increase in the number
of large producers does not always improve the sum of producers' prots when a for-prot
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retailer, who can unilaterally set the purchasing terms, is the only external retailer; the prot
of each large producer can be smaller than that of each small producer if there is a substantial
number of large producers, and the prot of each producer increases with an increase in the
number of large producers when the purchase price in the external channel does not change.
These results imply that the eect of expanding distribution channels substantially depends
on the market structure in the external channel. Agricultural cooperatives should consider
their bargaining position when they sign agreements with nationwide retailers for cooperative
distribution because the retailers tend to have strong bargaining power.
The current model does not explicitly consider rm behavior in the traditional distribution
channel in the sense that there is no active retailer in the traditional distribution channel. It
would be reasonable to consider producers' cooperatives (COOPs) in the traditional distribu-
tion channel as discussed in Fousekis (2015), who discuss mixed duopsony with a cooperative.12
7 Appendix
The appendix provides the proofs of the statements in the main text.
The proof of Remark 1 The dierence is given by
~Ma   ~Mb = 2c
2(c+ )((N + 1) + 2c)
(3c+ 2)(2(1 +N)2 + (5 + 3N)c + 4c2)
:
Dierentiating it with respect to N , we have
@( ~Ma   ~Mb)
@N
=   4c
3(c+ )2
(3c+ 2)(2(1 +N)2 + (5 + 3N)c + 4c2)2
< 0:
That is, the dierence decreases in N . When N = 0, the dierence is
2c2(c+ )(2c+ )
(3c+ 2)(22 + 5c + 4c2)
;
which is smaller than 1 if and only if 44 + 16c3 + 21c22 + 6c3   4c4 > 0. Therefore, we
have the statement in the remark.
12As mentioned in Fousekis (2015, p.518-9), the extension is related to the discussion of mixed markets in
which the objective functions dier among rms (e.g., a rm's objective to maximize total surplus). For instance,
in the context of the vertical relations as discussed in our paper, Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Chang
and Ryu (2015) discuss mixed markets with vertical relations.
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Proof of Proposition 1 Dierentiating the four values in (1), (2), (3), and (4), with respect
to M , we have
@qlir(wr)
@M
=
8><>:  
(c+ )((c+ (N + 1))wr   c)
((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))2
< 0 if wr < w(N;M);
0 if wr  w(N;M);
@qlit(wr)
@M
=
8><>:
(c+ )((c+ (N + 1))wr   c)
((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))2
> 0 if wr < w(N;M);
0 if wr  w(N;M);
@qsit(wr)
@M
=
8>><>>:
(c+ (N + 1))wr   c
((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))2
> 0 if wr < w(N;M);

(c+ (N  M + 1))2 > 0 if wr  w(N;M);
@pt(wr)
@M
=
8>><>>:
(c+ )((c+ (N + 1))wr   c)
((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))2
> 0 if wr < w(N;M);
(c+ )
(c+ (N  M + 1))2 > 0 if wr  w(N;M):
Proof of Proposition 2 It is easy to nd that li(wr) does not change with an increase in
M when wr  w(N;M). For M such that wr < w(N;M),
@li(wr)
@M
=
2(c+ )((c+ (N + 1))wr   c)((c+ )  (c+ (N  M + 1))wr)
((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))3
> 0:
Note that, to check the sign, we use the condition that qlir(wr) and q
l
it(wr) are positive when
wr < w(N;M).
It is easy to nd that si (wr) increases with an increase in M when wr  w(N;M). For M
such that wr < w(N;M),
@si (wr)
@M
=
(+Mwr)(c+ 2)((c+ (N + 1))wr   c)
((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))3
> 0:
Note that, to check the sign, we use the condition that qlir(wr) is positive when wr < w(N;M).
For M such that wr  w(N;M), the partial dierential of (Mli(wr) + (N  M)si (wr))
with respect to M is given as
@(Mli(wr) + (N  M)si (wr))
@M
=
w2r
2c
+
2(c+ 2)((N  M   1)   c)
2(c+ (N  M + 1))3 : (16)
We further dierentiate it with respect to M , and we obtain
2(c+ 2)((N  M)   2( + c))
(c+ (N  M + 1))4 :
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Its sign is the same with that of the numerator which is monotonically decreasing inM . On the
range ofM such that wr  w(N;M), there are three possibilities on the sign of this numerator:
(i) (+) for small M but ( ) for large M ; (ii) (+) for all M ; (iii) ( ) for all M . From the three
possibilities, we nd that the partial dierential of (Mli(wr) + (N  M)si (wr)) is minimized
at M = 0 or the highest value of M on the range of M such that wr  w(N;M), that is,
M = (((N +1)+ c)wr+(+ c))=(wr). First, we check the sign of the partial dierential in
(16) whenM = 0. The partial dierential is minimized at the lowest value of wr in Assumption
1. When wr is the left-hand side of min in Assumption 1, the partial dierential is
2(2Nc2 + (4N + 1)c+ (N + 1)2)
2c(c+ (N + 1))3
> 0:
When wr is the right-hand side of min in Assumption 1, the partial dierential is
2F1
8(c+ (N + 1))3((2N + 1)c+N(N + 1))2
;
where F1  4(2N + 1)(5N2   1)c3 + (45N4 + 92N3 + 22N2   12N   3)c2 + (N + 1)(13N4 +
48N3   6N2   8N + 1)2c + 8(N   1)N2(N + 1)23(> 0). Second, we check the sign of
the partial dierential in (16) when M is the maximum value of wr  w(N;M), that is,
M = (((N + 1) + c)wr + ( + c))=(wr). The partial dierential is
w2r(
2+ 2c(+ wr)(c+ 2))
2c(c+ )2
(> 0):
The partial dierential of (Mli(wr) + (N  M)si (wr)) with respect to M is positive when
wr  w(N;M).
For M such that wr < w(N;M), the partial dierential of (M
l
i(wr) + (N  M)si (wr))
with respect to M is given as
@(Mli(wr) + (N  M)si (wr))
@M
=
qlir(wr)F2
2(c+ )((M + 1)c+ (N + 1))2
;
where F2  f(2c+)(c+(N +1))2wf  c(2c2+5c  (N   3)2)g+ f(2c+3)c2  c(2c2+
7c + (N + 5)2)wfgM . We now check whether F2 is positive when wr is on the range in
Assumption 1. F2 is a linear function of M . We rst check the sign of the constant term.
Because this term is increasing in wf , this is minimized when wf is at the lowest value in
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Assumption 1. Substituting the two possible lowest values in Assumption 1 into the constant
term in F2, we have
(2c+ )(c+ (N + 1))2  (2(2N + 1)c+ (N + 1)(3N + 1))c
2(c+ (N + 1))((2N + 1)c+N(N + 1))
 c(2c2 + 5c  (N   3)2)
=
cf2(5N2   1)c2 + (6N3 + 15N2   1)c+ (5N3 + 3N2  N + 1)2g
2((2N + 1)c+N(N + 1))
(> 0);
(2c+ )(c+ (N + 1))2  (c+ )
c+ (N + 1)
  c(2c2 + 5c  (N   3)2)
= f2Nc2 + (4N + 1)c+ (N + 1)2g(> 0):
The constant term is always positive for any wr in Assumption 1.
From this outcome and the linearity of F2, if F2 is positive when M = N , then we can
conclude that F2 is always positive. When M = N , F2 is
F2jM=N = ((N   3) + 2(N   1)c)c  f2(N   1)c2 + (N   3)c  (N + 1)22gwf :
This is a linear function of wf and the constant term is positive because N  3 by assumption.
If this is positive when wf is at the lowest value and at the highest value, this linear function
is positive for any wf in Assumption 1. Substituting the three values into wf in F2jM=N , we
have
((N   3) + 2(N   1)c)c
 f2(N   1)c2 + (N   3)c  (N + 1)22g  (2(2N + 1)c+ (N + 1)(3N + 1))c
2(c+ (N + 1))((2N + 1)c+N(N + 1))
=
(N + 1)( + c)cF3
2(c+ (N + 1))((2N + 1)c+N(N + 1))
(> 0);
((N   3) + 2(N   1)c)c  f2(N   1)c2 + (N   3)c  (N + 1)22g  (c+ )
c+ (N + 1)
=
( + c)f2N(N   1)c2 + (2N2  N + 1)c+ (N + 1)22g
c+ (N + 1)
(> 0);
((N   3) + 2(N   1)c)c  f2(N   1)c2 + (N   3)c  (N + 1)22g  
= (N + 1)22(c+ )(> 0);
where F3  f2(3N2   2N   1)c2 + (4N3 + 7N2   6N   1)c+ (5N3 + 3N2  N + 1)2g(> 0).
Therefore, F2jM=N is positive, thus, F2 is positive. From the discussion, we can conclude that
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the partial dierential of (Mli(wr) + (N  M)si (wr)) with respect to M is positive under
Assumption 1.
Proof of Proposition 3 It is easy to nd that qlit(w

r) = 0 when M <
~Ma. When M > ~Ma,
@qlit(w

r)
@M
=
c(N + 1)(c+ )(2c+ (N + 1))
2f(1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2g2 > 0:
It is easy to nd that @qlir(w

r)=@M < 0 when M < ~Mb and that @q
l
ir(w

r)=@M > 0 when
~Mb M  ~Ma. When M > ~Ma,
@qlir(w

r)
@M
=   (N + 1)(c+ )((1 +N)
2 + (2 +N)c + 2c2)
2f(1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2g2 < 0:
We check how an increase in M inuences qsit(w

r). The rst-order partial derivatives of
qsit(w

r) with respect to M is given as
@qsit(w

r)
@M
=
8>><>>:
(N + 1)c2
2f(1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2g2 > 0 if
~Ma < M ,

(c+  + (N  M))2 > 0 if M 
~Ma.
Proof of Proposition 4 It is easy to nd that @wr=@M < 0 when M < ~Mb and that
@wr=@M > 0 when ~Mb M  ~Ma. When M  ~Ma,
@wr
@M
=   c(1 +N)(c+ )(c+ (1 +N))
2f(1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2g2 < 0:
The partial derivative of pt with respect to M is given as
@pt
@M
=
8>><>>:
(c+ )
(c+  + (N  M))2 > 0 if M <
~Ma;
c2(N + 1)(c+ )
2f(1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2g2 > 0 if
~Ma M:
Proof of Proposition 5 We check how an increase in M inuences prots. For M > ~Ma,
the partial derivative of li(w

r) with respect to M is given as
@li(w

r)
@M
=
c(N + 1)2(c+ )F4
4(c+ (1 +N))f(1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2g3 :
where F4  (3c + (1 + N))(2(1 + N)2 + (5 + 3N)c + 4c2)M   (c + (1 + N))(2c + (1 +
N))((2N   1)c+ (1 +N)). F4 is positive (negative) when M = N (M = ~Ma) (F4jM= ~Ma =
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 (N + 1)(c+ )(c+ (N + 1))2). F4 = 0 when
M =
(c+ (1 +N))(2c+ (1 +N))((2N   1)c+ (1 +N))
(3c+ (1 +N))(2(1 +N)2 + (5 + 3N)c + 4c2)
=Mc:
Note that @li(w

r)=@M < 0 when M <
~Mb and that @
l
i(w

r)=@M > 0 when
~Mb M  ~Ma.
For M  ~Ma, it is easy to nd that @si (wr)=@M > 0. For M > ~Ma,
@si (w

r)
@M
=
c2(N + 1)2(c+ 2)F5
4(c+ (1 +N))f(1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2g3 > 0:
where F5  2M(1 +N)2 + (2(1 +N) + (5 + 3N)M)c + 2(1 + 2M)c2 > 0.
For M > ~Ma, the dierence between the prots of small and large producers is given as
si (w

r)  li(wr)
=
c(N + 1)2F6
8(c+ (1 +N))f(1 +N)M2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)M)c + (1 + 2M)c2g2 ;
where F6  (8c2+2(5+3N)c+4(N+1)2)M  (2(N 1)c2+(2N2+N 1)c+(N+1)22).
F6 is negative (positive) when M = ~Ma (M = N) (F6jM= ~Ma =  (N + 1)(c + (N + 1))).
Thus, there exists M such that F6 = 0.
To prove the claim that a small producer does not have an incentive to expand its distribu-
tion channel if the number of large producers is large, we need to compare si (w

r) when M = k
and li(w

r) when M = k + 1. If the former is larger than the latter, each small producer does
not have an incentive to expand its distribution channel when M = k. The dierence between
the two values is given as
si (w

r)jM=k   li(wr)

M=k+1
=
c(N + 1)2F8
F7
;
where F7  8(c+ (1+N))f(1 +N)k2+ ((1+N) + (2+N)k)c + (1+ 2k)c2g2f(1 +N)(k+
24
1)2 + ((1 +N) + (2 +N)(k + 1))c + (3 + 2k)c2g2 and
F8  a0 + a1k + a2k2 + a3k3; where
a0 =  c2f2(N + 1)c4 + 6(N2 + 3)c3 + 2(3N3  N2 + 8N + 16)2c2
+(2N4 +N3 +N2 + 23N + 21)3c+ (N4 + 2N2 + 8N + 5)4g;
a1 =  2cf4(N   2)c5 + 2(5N2   10N   4)c4
+(8N3   9N2   34N + 5)2c3 + (2N4 + 5N3   23N2   19N + 11)3c2
+(3N4  N3   13N2   3N + 6)4c+ (N2   1)25g;
a2 =  f8(N   7)c6 + 16(N2   6N   10)c5 + 2(5N3   20N2   133N   108)2c4
+(2N4 + 7N3   129N2   308N   170)3c3
+(5N4   10N3   121N2   188N   82)4c2
+(N + 1)2(4N2   15N   23)5c+ (N + 1)3(N   3)6g;
a3 = 2f2c2 + (N + 2)c+ (N + 1)2g2f4c2 + (3N + 5)c+ 2(N + 1)2g:
The sign of the dierence, si (w

r)jM=k   li(wr)

M=k+1
, is the same with that of F8. F8 is a
continuous function of k, a0 < 0, and a3 > 0. We now prove that F8 > 0 when k  N=3. To
do it, we check the following: rst, we show that F8 is convex in k on the range [N=3; N   1];
second, we show that F8 is increasing in k on the range [N=3; N   1]; nally, we show that
F8 > 0 for k 2 [N=3; N   1].
First, we show the rst matter. Because a3 > 0, it is sucient to show that @
2F8=@k
2
is positive at k = N=3. Substituting k = N=3 into @2F8=@k
2, we obtain @2F8=@k
2jk=N=3 =
2f8(3N+7)c6+40(N2+5N+4)c5+2(11N3+104N2+213N+108)2c4+(4N4+83N3+353N2+
452N+170)3c3+(11N4+110N3+285N2+268N+82)4c2+(N+1)2(10N2+41N+23)5c+
3(N+1)46g, which is positive. Second, we show the second matter. Because F8 is convex in k,
it is sucient to show that @F8=@k is positive at k = N=3. Substituting k = N=3 into @F8=@k,
we obtain @F8=@kjk=N=3 = (2=3)f4(2N2+11N+6)c6+2(6N3+59N2+110N+12)c5+(6N4+
100N3+373N2+318N 15)2c4+(N5+32N4+226N3+449N2+227N 33)3c3+(3N5+51N4+
206N3+267N2+91N 18)4c2+(N+1)2(3N3+25N2+29N 3)5c+N(N+1)3(N+3)6g,
which is positive. Finally, we show the third matter. Because F8 is increasing in k, it is
sucient to show that F8 is positive at k = N=3. Substituting k = N=3 into F8, we obtain
F8jk=N=3 = (1=27)f(8N3+96N2+90N   54)c6+2(4N4+106N3+339N2+72N   243)c5+
2(N5+72N4+479N3+657N2 261N 432)2c4+(33N5+467N4+1455N3+825N2 819N 
567)3c3 + (N6 + 76N5 + 518N4 + 878N3 + 246N2   324N   135)4c2 + N(N + 1)2(2N3 +
25
53N2 + 105N   18)5c + N2(N + 1)3(N + 9)6g, which is positive. Therefore, F8 > 0 for
k 2 [N=3; N   1].
Proof of Proposition 6 The discussion is presented in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 7 We check how an increase in M inuences the total surplus. For
M > ~Ma, the partial derivative of the total surplus with respect to M is given as
@

Mli

+ (N  M)si  + r + CSt + CSr

=@M =
c(N + 1)2(c+ (N + 1))2F9
D3
;
where F9  4(M(N   1) +N)c4 + f3 + 15N + 8N2 + 6M( 1 + 2N +N2)gc3 + f6 + 20N +
18N2+4N3+M(2+21N+17N2+2N3)g2c2+(1+N)f3(1+N)2+M(7+16N+5N2)g3c+
3M(1 +N)34: We easily nd that the sign of the partial derivative is the same with that of
F9, which is plus. Therefore, the partial derivative is positive for any M > ~Ma.
For ~Mb M  ~Ma, the partial derivative of the total surplus with respect to M is given as
1
2
 @

Mli

+ (N  M)si  + r + CSt + CSr

=@M
=
c(2Nc2 + (2N2 + 6N + 1)c+ (2N2 + 3N + 1)2)
2c2(c+ (N  M + 1))3
 M(2c+ )(2c
2 + (2N + 5)c+ 2(N + 1)2)
2c2(c+ (N  M + 1))3 :
This is decreasing in M . When M = ~Ma, this is
@

Mli

+ (N  M)si  + r + CSt + CSr

=@M

M= ~Ma
=
2c(N + 1)(c+ )(2c3 + (3N + 8)c2 + 2(N2 + 7N + 7)c+ (N2 + 3N + 2)3)
4c2 + (3N + 5)c+ 2(N + 1)2
> 0:
Therefore, the partial derivative is positive for ~Mb M  ~Ma.
For M < ~Mb, the partial derivative of the total surplus with respect to M is given as
1
2
 @

Mli

+ (N  M)si  + r + CSt + CSr

=@M
=
c( c3 + (5N   3)c2 + 2(9N2 + 18N + 1)c+ 33(N + 1)3)
8(c+ M)2(c+ (N  M + 1))3
 c(13c
2 + 2(13N + 21)c+ 3(9N2 + 18N + 25)c)M
8(c+ M)2(c+ (N  M + 1))3
+
(132c2 + 3(5N   3)c  4)M2 + 3cM3
8(c+ M)2(c+ (N  M + 1))3 :
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Note that ~Mb is not strictly positive if and only if c  (N   1). Thus, we do not need to
consider the case in whichM < ~Mb if c  (N 1). From here on, we assume that c < (N 1).
To prove that the numerator is positive, we dierentiate it with respect to M , and obtain
 c(13c2+2(13N+21)c+2(9N2+18N+25))+(262c2+23(5N 3)c 164)M+33cM2;
which is convex in M and the rst term is negative. Therefore, this is always negative if this
is negative at M = ~Mb. Substituting M = ~Mb into it, we obtain
 4c((N + 1) + 2c)(24c
3 + 4(3N + 17)c2 + 22(11N + 30)c+ 3(9N + 17))
(3c+ 2)2
(< 0):
We nd that the numerator is monotonically decreasing in M when M < ~Mb. If the numerator
is positive at M = 0 and M = ~Mb, it is always positive for M < ~Mb. When M = 0, the
numerator is c( c3 + (5N   3)c2 + 2(9N2 + 18N + 1)c + 33(N + 1)3); which is larger
than c( ((N   1))3 + (5N   3)(0)2 + 2(9N2 + 18N + 1)(0) + 33(N + 1)3)(> 0) because
0 < c < (N   1). When M = ~Mb, the numerator is
8c( + c)((N + 1) + 2c)2(4c3 + (2N + 11)c2 + 22(3N + 5)c+ 33(N + 1))
(3c+ 2)3
(> 0):
We nd that the numerator is always positive for M < ~Mb. Therefore, the partial derivative is
positive for M < ~Mb.
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Figure 1: Quantities (wr is exogenous)
N = 30, 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Figure 2: The prots of large and small producers (wr is exogenous)
N = 30,  = 1,  = 1, c = 2, wr = 1=10
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Figure 3: The sum of the producers' prots (wr is exogenous)
N = 30,  = 1,  = 1, c = 2, wr = 1=10
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Figure 4: Quantities (wr is endogenous)
N = 30,  = 1,  = 1, c = 2
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Figure 5: Retail price and purchase price (wr is endogenous)
N = 30,  = 1,  = 1, c = 2
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Figure 6: The prots of large and small producers (wr is endogenous)
N = 30,  = 1,  = 1, c = 2
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Figure 7: The sum of the producers' prots (wr is endogenous) N = 30,  = 1,  = 1,
c = 2
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Figure 8: The sum of the producers' prots (wr is endogenous) N = 30,  = 1,  = 1
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Figure 9: The total surplus (wr is endogenous) N = 30,  = 1,  = 1, c = 2
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